Safety at complex industrial system (Large Industries)

 According to Perrow (1984), it is advisable to classify failures occurring at the individual and unit levels as incidents, whereas failures occurring at the subsystem and system levels should be classified as accidents. This distinction differs from the classifications previously outlined in the safety management system. Although this particular definition may not align with the conventional perspective of safety experts, a meticulous examination of each individual accident reveals its complete accuracy. Additionally, Perrow posited that specific accidents can be attributed to inescapable entanglements of components functioning at various levels within a system. As per his assertion, a significant proportion of engineering safety components are specifically created to prevent situations from escalating into accidents. Failures leading to incidents transitioning into accidents are events that can circumvent engineered safety measures and remain unpreventable. Perrow (1984) further identified tight connection and complex interactions as additional factors that render events unpredictable.

Complex interactions are defined as those that take place and are unanticipated or unknown (Perrow, 1994). As a result, it's possible for events to go unnoticed for a very long time. A system that is tightly coupled is very well-organized; there is no room for errors. The foundation of NAT is the assumption that mistakes are caused by chance, much like regular accidents.

The Human Reliability and Error Theory also presented the notion of how a human factor could affect an accident at the same time. This theory was built on Heinrich's earlier work and offered a more sophisticated and in-depth examination of human error or, more accurately, Unsafe act. Additionally, the coupling system-based dominos theory of accident in huge organizations was redefined concurrently by NAT theory. Therefore, it can be said that Anthony J. Gittins' NAT theory was essentially a balanced analysis of the Heinrich Theory and Domino Theory.

As of now, our work has presented a pretty compelling argument for how the human factor influences the likelihood of an accident in a particular industry. But it's important to understand how this concept first came to be in order to properly understand the human side. The 1970s saw the development of the Human Factors Theory, which emphasizes how human behavior contributes to accidents. It claims that most accidents are caused mostly by human mistake and that accidents can be avoided by raising knowledge of the risks and changing the working environment.

Todd LaPorte, Gene Rochlin, and Karlene Roberts developed the Human Reliability and Error theory of accident at the University of California, Berkeley to investigate how organizations managing dangerous and complex systems manage safely. This dependability and human error hypothesis is based on intricate systems or vast organizations. It incorporates the effects of numerous factors on the chance of an accident or incident and is an extension of current theories of human mistake, such as Reason's Swiss Cheese model.

The Swiss cheese model of accident causation is a model used to describe how accidents occur due to a mix of causes, thus it is vital to give a brief overview of it now that we have discussed it. It compares the various components in an accident chain to slices of Swiss cheese, with the gaps signifying flaws in the architecture. The alignment of the holes in the cheese slices creates a path for an accident to happen.